

October 3, 2012

NRC 2012-0090 10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Docket 50-266 Renewed License No. DPR-24

<u>Licensee Event Report 266/2012-004-00</u> <u>Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip</u>

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 266/2012-004-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC is providing this LER regarding the Unit 1 manual reactor trip.

This submittal contains no new or revised regulatory commitments.

If you have questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Jim Costedio at 920/755-7427.

Very truly yours,

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Larry Meyer

Site Vice President

**Enclosure** 

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC

Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC

**PSCW** 

NRC FO	RM 366			U.S. N	UCLEAR	REGULATOR	RY COMMI	ISSION	APPROV	ED BY OME	3: NO. 3150	-0104	EXPIRES:	10/31/2013	
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet émail to infocollects.resourse@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.							
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)  On August 14, 2012 at 2031, a Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 manual reactor trip was actuated due to indications of a loss of load to the main turbine.  At approximately 2031 alarms were received in the control room indicating reduced PBNP Unit 1 turbine first stage pressure and generator megawatts, indicative of a reduction in turbine load. Control rods were responding as designed by inserting into the reactor to reduce reactor power. Based on these indications, the Shift Manager directed that the reactor be shutdown by manually actuating the reactor protection system. No automatic reactor protection setpoints were exceeded and an automatic shutdown was not actuated or required.  Based on troubleshooting, NextEra determined that the loss of turbine load was due to a failure of the main speed channel card in the electro-hydraulic (EH) system. The speed channel card was replaced.  Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A), the event is reportable as an event or condition that resulted in manual actuation of the reactor protection system.															

# CONTINUATION SHEET

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	5500000	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	0.00
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#### NARRATIVE

### **Description of the Event**

On August 14, 2012, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 was operating in a steady state condition at 100% power with no plant evolutions in progress. At approximately 2031 alarms were received in the control room indicating reduced PBNP Unit 1 turbine first stage pressure and generator megawatts, indicative of a reduction in turbine load. Control rods were responding as designed by inserting into the reactor to reduce reactor power. Based on these indications, the Shift Manager directed that the reactor be shutdown by manually actuating the reactor protection system. No automatic reactor protection setpoints were exceeded and an automatic shutdown was not actuated or required.

A failure investigation process (FIP) was entered. Based on troubleshooting, NextEra determined that the loss of turbine load was due to a failure of the main speed channel 'B' card in the electro-hydraulic EH [HCU] system.

Both 'A' and 'B' speed channel cards in the EH system were replaced with spares and calibrated. This was done as a conservative measure since only the 'B' card had falled. The calibration was completed satisfactory and the EH system was subsequently returned-to-service.

This event is not reported as a safety system functional failure.

## **Analysis of the Event**

Turbine speed is controlled by the turbine EH system. The EH system has two independent speed sensing circuits, each comprised of a passive probe and two printed circuit cards.

The Main speed channel circuit is designed to regulate turbine speed. When the turbine is offline it inputs to the turbine speed controller, and is used for turbine roll up. When the turbine is connected to the grid, it is the input to the frequency correction circuitry.

The Auxiliary speed channel circuit is dedicated to overspeed protection. When an overspeed condition is sensed in excess of 103% of rated turbine speed, the Auxiliary Governor closes the governor valves and actuates other protective features.

In the Main speed channel circuit the speed channel 'B' card takes the pulse train from the speed channel 'A' card and converts it to an analog signal that is proportional to shaft speed. This signal is used as the supply to the speed controller circuit which is the circuit that drives the governor valves to maintain turbine speed.

The speed control circuit determines the speed error based on actual turbine speed versus demanded speed. This signal is then sent to the governor valve controller which uses it as an input to determine the governor valve control signal.

NextEra determined that the Main speed channel circuit channel 'B' card falled in a manner that caused the card to generate a high turbine speed signal. This caused the governor valve control circuit to close the governor valves, which caused the generator to shed load. These indications were the initiating event for the PBNP Unit 1 manual reactor trip.

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#### NARRATIVE

## **Analysis of Safety Significance**

A manual reactor trip was initiated in response to the turbine governor valves closing and the loss of generator load while the reactor was still at power. No automatic reactor protection setpoints were exceeded, and the automatic reactor protection system was not actuated nor needed. Plant systems functioned as required following the trip.

The reactivity effects during this particular event had no impact on the safety of the core. The initial event resulted in reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature rising as steam demand was reduced by the closing governor valves. At this stage in core life, the moderator temperature coefficient is largely negative (approximately -22 pcm/deg F); thus, the rising temperature added significant negative reactivity. The control rods began to insert into the core to control the temperature increase as designed. The Shift Manager and operating crew responded appropriately by manually actuating the reactor protection system to shut down the reactor.

#### **Corrective Actions**

The 'A' and 'B' main speed cards were replaced with spares and calibrated.

### **Similar Events**

LER 2012-001-00, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip

#### **Failed Components**

1C-039, Main Speed Channel B card, Motorola LM201AH Op Amp